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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)(J)(1996). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court error in failing to quiet title in the Plaintiffs. 
2. Was the district court's decision inconsistent with the Utah Court of 
Appeal's previous appellate decision, thus violating the law of the case doctrine. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is a quiet title action , and "[a] quiet title action necessarily involves an 
ultimate conclusion of law as to whom owns the disputed piece of property. In reviewing 
the trial court's conclusions of law, we accord them no particular deference but review 
them for correctness." Falula Farms, Inc v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 
1993)(citing Oates v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)). 
The issues in this case raise questions of law which must be reviewed on appeal 
for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); MacKintosh v. 
Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court's decision in this case also 
interprets Utah statutes. "A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law which is reviewed on appeal for correctness." Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 
759 (Utah 1990). The trial court's decision is therefore entitled to no deference. In the 
event this court determines the decision of the trial court constitutes a mixed question of 
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fact and law, a correction of its standard applies, or the "clearly erroneous standards of 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)." Termude v. Cook. 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 
1990) (per curium). 
These issues were raised below and addressed by the trial court in its ruling of 
February 17, 1995 (R. 241) and the finding of fact and conclusions of law of May 19, 
1999. (R.250), as well as this court in Nelson v. Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (March 1994). 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE IN THIS APPEAL 
These statutes are either determinative or of central importance in the present 
matter. These statutes are reproduced in Appendix A or in the body of the Brief. 
1. Federal Townsite Act, ch. 177, 14 Stat. 541 (1867) 
2. Utah Township Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-1 (1953, as amended) 
3. C.L. 17,2801 
4. CLU§2071.§7(1888) 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-7 (1953, as amended) 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (1953, as amended 1991) 
Also attached hereto in Appendix B are copies of cases plaintiffs maintain are 
determinative in this matter. 
4. Nelson v. Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) 
5. Falula Farms. Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter has previously been reviewed by this court in Nelson v. Provo City. 
872 P.2d 35 (March 1994). A copy of the opinion is attached in Appendix B. The 
original ruling of the trial court was reversed and remanded. Upon remand the trial court 
ruled: 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion cited as Nelson v. Provo City. 
872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994). The facts are essentially undisputed, and 
this court lists the facts substantially the same as the Court of Appeals. 
(R.241). 
The Court of Appeals stated the facts as follows which remained the facts upon remand: 
Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal government 
deeded the roadway along with the abutting lands in trust to the local 
municipality authority Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee (the 
Townsite conveyance). The roadway existed as a public thoroughfare prior 
to this conveyance. The parties do not dispute that landowners, 
predecessors and interest do not occupy the roadway or the abutting 
property at the time of the townsite conveyance. Nor do they dispute that 
the meets and bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to the roadway 
but did not specifically exclude it. 
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the roadway to James Dunn, who in 
1876 deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a portion of the Stubbs' 
parcel was deeded to appellants Steven Whitlock and Shiela Whitlock. In 
1985, Steven Whitlock alone received another portion of the Stubbs'parcel. 
Finally, in 1991, Appellants Boyd Nelson and Lorraine Nelson received a 
deed for another portion of the Stubbs'parcel. 
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as 
trustee of the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First Ward Pasture 
Company deeded its parcel to the city. Nine Hundred South continued to be 
used as a public roadway. 
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In its regularly scheduled meeting of August 22, 1999, the Provo Municipal 
Counsel passed Ordinance Number 0-89-055, which purported to vacate 
and set aside the roadway. After passing the ordinance, the city published 
notice one time in the Provo Daily Herald on August 31, 1989. The city 
mailed no notice of the vacation to the abutting land owners either before or 
after the fact. The city then rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the 
property owned to the south of the original route and sold the vacated 
portion of the original route to a commercial developer. The vacation of the 
roadway landlocked one lot south and deprived two other lots of access to 
900 South. 
Landowners sued city claiming a reversionary interest in the roadway from 
their property lines to the middle of the roadway. They sought 
compensation, and, in the alternative, the setting aside of the vacation. City 
counterclaimed for quiet title to the roadway. 
On July 6, 1992, the trial court quieted title in the city as against 
landowners, concluding that the city held fee simple title since the time of 
the townsite conveyance. Landowners moved for specific findings 
regarding city's compliance with the Townsite Act and the State Township 
Act. The trial court denied the motion. Landowners appeal. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35-36. See Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 250). The 
Court of Appeals in Nelson held: 
Landowners claim that city could not have acquired title to 900 South under 
the patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a 
deed. We agree. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37(emphasis added). The Nelson court also noted: 
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the state's supposing legislation, 
provides that townsite's conveyance transferred land to a municipality and 
trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any 
other claimant, would have to obtain a deed. 
Here, the parties agree that city never explicitly reserves the roadway or 
obtained a deed to the roadway pursuant to § 57-7-8 or -17. Thus, city 
remains the holder of the roadway in trust. City purported to vacate the 
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roadway as absolute owner, without regard to its responsibilities as trustee 
under the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the 
trial court to consider the city's role as trustee of the roadway, with it 
attendant fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, in this case, the collective 
occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718. 
Id at 35. The Court of Appeals in Nelson specifically held that the city did not own the 
property in absolute ownership. Id at 38. The Nelson court also recognized that title to 
the property at the time of the Townsite Act was "in the United States." Id at 36. 
This court held: 
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust 
only; (2) hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to 
statute[.] 
Id at 38. 
Upon remand, the Fourth Judicial District Court held that it was not necessary for 
the city to formally vacate the roadway. The trial court's ruling as well as the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are attached in Appendix C. The trial court emphasized its 
own holding in direct contravention of the Court of Appeal's holding that the city held 
title to the property. The Trial court ruled: 
In the Court's determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on 
which the Roadway was located (albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that 
the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the grant of easement which 
would carry with it a reversionary interest. 
(R. 238). The trial court further concluded that the city owned the land where the 
roadway had been and that, therefore, the city did not need to vacate the roadway. 
Instead, the trial court concluded the City could simply sell the property, which the City 
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had ostensibly done. The trial court therefore concluded: 
This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and 
responsibility when it determined that it was in the best interest of the 
collective occupants of the city of Provo to realign the Roadway to create a 
functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property which it 
held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general 
treasury for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo. 
(R.238). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In 1871 the determinative actions in this matter took place. An east to west 
running street, 900 South in Provo, already existed, and pursuant to state law the street 
was a dedicated roadway. Connected with the Federal Townsite Act, A.O. Smoot 
transferred title to all land both north and south of 900 South by way of deeds, which 
deeds did not expressly exclude 900 South. At that point in time, the rights of the 
abutting landowners were fixed. Pursuant to existing law, which remains effective today, 
those grants conveyed the property to the center line of the Roadway. Accordingly, in 
1871, looking to the future, should the roadway ever be vacated or abandoned, or cease to 
be used as a Roadway, the title to the property would revert to the abutting landowners. 
In the present case, that precipitating event occurred many years later - in 1989 -
when Provo City attempted to vacate the property, and in fact purported to sell the 
property to a private third party. However, the result is the same. The legal effect of 
Provo City's action in moving 900 South and abandoning the property was to vest fee 
simple title in the plaintiffs by operation of law. 
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The trial court below erred in holding that Provo City held title to old 900 South. 
Upon that erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court then proceeded to further erroneous 
conclusions. The trial court's determination must be overturned because (1) the trial 
court ignored and refused to follow this court's earlier opinion and rule consistent with 
the law of the case, and (2) the trial court misapplied the applicable law. In particular, 
the trial court did not presume that the original conveyances were to the middle of the 
Roadway as required by Utah law. Further, the trial misconstrued whether Provo City 
had title to the Roadway. This case demands remand with specific instruction to quiet 
title in the plaintiffs. 
The trial court did not apply the law of the case. This court's ruling in Nelson v. 
Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) was legally binding on the trial court. The 
Court of Appeals in Nelson held: 
Landowners claim that city could not have acquired title to 900 South under 
the patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a 
deed. We agree. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37(emphasis added). This court also noted: 
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the state's supposing legislation, 
provides that townsite's conveyance transferred land to a municipality and 
trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any 
other claimant, would have to obtain a deed. 
Here, the parties agree that city never explicitly reserves the roadway or 
obtained a deed[.] 
This court held: 
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We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust 
only; (2) hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to 
statute[.] 
Id at 38. 
Upon remand, the Fourth Judicial District Court held that it was not necessary for 
the city to formally vacate the roadway. The trial court emphasized that the city held title 
to the property. (R. 238). The trial court further concluded that the city owned the land 
where the roadway had been and that, therefore, the city did not need to vacate the 
roadway. Instead, the trial court concluded the City could simply sell the property, which 
the City had ostensibly done. The trial court's legal conclusions are at odds with the law 
of this case and must therefore be reversed. 
The transfer of land bounded by a roadway passes title to the center of the 
roadway. The law presumes that transfer of land bounded by highway passes title to the 
center of the highway. The trial court ignored this presumption. In the absence of 
evidence that the original grantor specifically intended to exclude the Roadway, the trial 
court should have presumed that title was transferred to the center of the Roadway. This 
conclusion is supported by long-standing Utah law. 
Utah law has always provided and remains consistent that land bounded by a street 
when a transfer is made passes title to the center of the street. The properties in the 
present appeal are bounded by property which used to be a street. As this court ruled in 
Nelson, the parties do not dispute "that the metes and bounds of each subsequent 
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conveyance ran to the Roadway but did not specifically exclude it." Nelson, 872 P.2d at 
35-36. Accordingly, when A.O. Smoot originally deeded the property to plaintiffs 
predecessors in interest, on both the north and south boundaries of the Roadway, the 
grants ran to the middle of the Roadway by operation of law. Therefore, the trial court 
erred when it ruled that the title to the property should be quieted in Provo City. 
Upon vacation or abandonment of the street, the fee reverted to the abutting 
property owners. In Nelson this court did not determine the exact interest which Provo 
City held when 900 South was moved. This court only held: 
Here, we determine that whether City's interest was that of a determinable 
fee or fee simple, the interest was held only in trust. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37, fn. 2. Within the City's role as trustee, the City could vacate or 
abandon old 900 South when it determined that a better route for 900 South existed. The 
City could not, however, change the legal consequence of this action, which was that the 
Roadway reverted to the abutting property owners. The City breached its fiduciary duties 
when the City attempted to deed property which it did not own. After the decision to 
move 900 South was reached and traffic was no longer upon old 900 South, the City as 
trustee no longer had any interest in the Roadway. 
The public only had an easement upon 900 South. Prior to the grant of 1871 all 
parties agree that 900 South already existed. All parties also agree that at the time of the 
grant, when Utah was still a territory of the United States, the land upon which 900 South 
was situated was owned by the United States. Thus, the public had but an easement to 
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travel thereupon. The grant in 1871 did not change this fundamental interest. A.O. 
Smoot only transferred property to the abutting landowners; the city received no deed, nor 
did the City reserve the Roadway. The underlying reversionary interest was granted to 
the abutting landowners long before 1989. 
The trial court even recognized if all the City had was an easement, plaintiffs 
theory upon which they maintained a right to a quiet title would prevail. The trial court 
stated: "The Court believes that Plaintiffs' argument would have merit if the City and the 
collective occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use 
the road." (R. 238). With the correct law applied, including this court's determinations 
in Nelson, plaintiffs' position must prevail. Title must be quieted in the plaintiffs. 
In this case, Provo City has de facto vacated, or more clearly abandoned old 900 
South. Accordingly, the plaintiffs as abutting landowners own and should possess the 
underlying property. When Provo City no longer used 900 South as a street and either 
impliedly vacated it or abandoned its use, the city no longer had any legal interest in the 
northern one-half of the street as it reverted to the plaintiffs herein as the successors of the 
original grantees. 
ARGUMENT 
In 1871 the determinative actions in this matter took place. An east to west 
running street, 900 South in Provo, already existed, and pursuant to state law the roadway 
was dedicated. Connected with the Federal Townsite Act, A.O. Smoot transferred title to 
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all land both north and south of 900 South by way of deeds, which deeds did not 
expressly exclude 900 South. At that point in time, the rights of the abutting landowners 
were fixed. Pursuant to existing law, which remains effective today, those grants 
conveyed the property to the center line of the Roadway. Accordingly, in 1871, looking 
to the future, should the roadway ever be vacated or abandoned, or cease to be used as a 
Roadway, the title to the property would revert to the abutting landowners. 
In the present case, that precipitating event occurred many years later - in 1989 -
when Provo City attempted to vacate the property, and in fact purported to sell the 
property to a private third party. However, the result is the same. The legal effect of 
Provo City's action in moving 900 South and abandoning the property was to vest fee 
simple title in the plaintiffs by operation of law. 
The trial court below erred in holding that Provo City held title to old 900 South. 
Upon that erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court then proceeded to further erroneous 
conclusions. The trial court's determination must be overturned because (1) the trial 
court ignored and refused to follow this court's earlier opinion and rule consistent with 
the law of the case, and (2) the trial court misapplied the applicable law. In particular, 
the trial court did not presume that the original conveyances were to the middle of the 
Roadway as required by Utah law. Further, the trial misconstrued whether Provo City 
had title to the Roadway. This case demands remand with specific instruction to quiet 
title in the plaintiffs. 
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I. The Trial Court Did Not Apply The Law Of The Case 
This court's ruling in Nelson v. Provo Citv. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) was 
legally binding on the trial court. Under the law of the case doctrine, a decision once 
made is binding on successive stages of the same litigation. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 
734, 739 (Utah 1990). One prong of the law of the case doctrine is known as the mandate 
rule which provides: 
[Pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the 
law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that 
case. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The lower court must 
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate. Id. This rule is inflexible and 
requires even the appellate court to follow earlier pronouncements, even if the appellate 
court on a subsequent appeal disagrees with an earlier determination. 
The Court of Appeals in Nelson held: 
Landowners claim that city could not have acquired title 1o 900 South under 
the patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a 
deed. We agree. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37. The Nelson court also noted: 
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the state's supposing legislation, 
provides that townsite's conveyance transferred land to a municipality and 
trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any 
other claimant, would have to obtain a deed. 
Here, the parties agree that city never explicitly reserves the roadway or 
obtained a deed to the roadway pursuant to § 57-7-8 or -17. Thus, city 
remains the holder of the roadway in trust. City purported to vacate the 
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roadway as absolute owner, without regard to its responsibilities as trustee 
under the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the 
trial court to consider the city's role as trustee of the roadway, with it 
attendant fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, in this case, the collective 
occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718. 
Id. at 35. The Court of Appeals in Nelson specifically held that the city did not own the 
property in absolute ownership. Id at 38. The Nelson court also recognized that title to 
the property at the time of the Townsite Act was "in the United States." Id. at 36. 
This court held: 
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust 
only; (2) hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to 
statute[.] 
Id at 38. 
Upon remand, the Fourth Judicial District Court held that it was not necessary for 
the city to formally vacate the roadway. The trial court emphasized its own ruling in 
direct contravention of the Court of Appeals, that the city held title to the property. The 
trial court ruled: 
In the Court's determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on 
which the Roadway was located (albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that 
the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the grant of easement which 
would carry with it a reversionary interest. 
(R. 238). The trial court further concluded that the city owned the land where the 
roadway had been and that, therefore, the city did not need to vacate the roadway. 
Instead, the trial court concluded the City could simply sell the property, which the City 
had ostensibly done. The trial court therefore concluded: 
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This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and 
responsibility when it determined that it was in the best interest of the 
collective occupants of the city of Provo to realign the Roadway to create a 
functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property which it 
held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general 
treasury for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo. 
(R. 237). 
The trial court's legal conclusions are at odds with the law of this case. This court 
expressly held that Provo City did not obtain a deed, nor did the City reserve the 
Roadway, and that therefore the City did not have title to the Roadway. The trial court 
erred by ignoring this court's mandate. The trial court's further erroneous conclusions 
flow from this mistake. Even the trial court recognized that if the City did not have title 
then title would revert to the abutting landowners. (R. 238). The trial court's ruling must 
be reversed. 
II. THE TRANSFER OF LAND BOUNDED BY A ROADWAY PASSES TITLE 
TO THE CENTER OF THE ROADWAY 
The law presumes that transfer of land bounded by a highway passes title to the 
center of the highway. The trial court ignored this presumption. In the absence of 
evidence that the original grantor specifically intended to excluded the Roadway, the trial 
court should have presumed that title was transferred to the center of the Roadway. This 
conclusion is supported by long-standing Utah law. 
"[A]t common law the owner of land which abutted a highway owned up to the 
middle of the highway." Falula Farms. Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App. 
14 
1993). A review of Utah law shows the Falula Farms court's conclusion to be accurate. 
A review of the law at the time of the transfer at issue in this case independently shows 
that as a matter of statutory law, when A.O. Smoot transferred the property, that transfer 
was to the middle of the Roadway. The property description on the deeds at issue did not 
exclude the Roadway. Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35. The trial court failed to appreciate that 
had A.O. Smoot wanted to reserve the road or exclude the road from the deeds, he could 
have so acted, but he did not. 
In Fenn v. Cedar Lumber & Hardware Co., 404 P.2d 966 (Utah 1965) the parties 
owning land abutting either side of a street property were entitled to fee simple interest to 
the center line of the street because the grantor who deeded the street property to the city 
was also the grantor of the abutting landowners, and no intention to the contrary appeared 
in any of the original deeds. That same lack of intention exists in the present matter. 
Under the undisputed facts and the law of this case, there is no question but that A.O. 
Smoot deeded to the center of the street. 
In the present circumstances, the city only acquired public highway easement to 
the roadway. In Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that based upon continuous use by the general 
public for a period of greater than 10 years, the roadway leading to a residence was 
impliedly dedicated to public as a public highway. The Kohler court also referred to § 
27-12-89 of the Utah Code, which states: 
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A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public when it has been continually used as a public thoroughfare 
for a period often years. 
At the time of the initial transfer at issue in this matter, law was well settled as to 
the ownership of land bounded by a street. "On the sale of a lot bounded by a street, the 
boundary is the middle of the street, unless otherwise stated expressly." Moody v. 
Palmer, 50 Cal. 31 (1886); Helmurage v. Castle, 119 111. 664 (111. 1884); Cox v. 
Louisville, 48 Ind. 178 (1874); City of Boston v. Richardson, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) (146 
Mass. 1866); In Re Reid, 13 N.H. 381 (N.H. 1843); Paul v. Carver, 26 Pa. St. (2) (Casey) 
223 (Pa. 1856); Morrow v. Willard, 30 Vt. 118 (Vt. 1857); Kimball v. City of Kenosha, 4 
Wis. 321 (Wis. 1855). "If the language of the deed describing land conveyed, bounded 
by a highway, leaves it doubtful whether the granter intended the line to be the center or 
on the side of the highway, the boundary will be construed to be in the center of the 
road." Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23 (Conn. 1838); Marsh v. Burk, (Vt. 1861). 
The common law has been adopted in Utah, so far as it is not in conflict with the 
Constitution or law of the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1(1953, as amended). 
Utah codified this common law doctrine in CLU § 2017. § 7 (as amended 1888), which 
stated: 
A transfer of land bounded by a highway, passes the title of the person 
whose estate has transferred, to the center of the highway. 
A succession of laws passed in the Utah Legislature continue to this day. "The provision 
of any statute, so far as they are the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed 
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as a continuation of such provisions and not as a new enactment." Utah Code Ann. § 68-
3-6 (1953, as amended). The revised statute of Utah, 1898, contained in almost identical 
statutory provision to the 1888 code, and provided: 
A transfer of land bounded by a highway passes the title of the person 
whose estate is transferred, to the center of the highway. 
C.L. § 2071, R.S. of Utah 1898 § 1120. 
The statute as revised in 1933 is even more specific to the case in point. That 
statute expressly addresses land used as a public road. The Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, provide: 
36-1-7. Public acquires only easement - by an abutting owner. 
By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquires only the right 
of way in incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of 
land bounded by a highway passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway. 
The annotation to this statute notes that Utah's law is merely a codification of the 
common law that a deed for land bounded by a public highway runs to the middle of that 
road. It states: 
The provisions of this section providing that the transfer of land bounded by 
a highway passes title to the middle of the highway is merely declaratory of 
the common law and has no application to the creation of a private 
easement as distinguished from a public easement. 
Brown v. O.S.L.Rv. Co.. 36 Utah 257, 102 P.740 (1909). 
The present Utah Code provides: 
A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right of way for which the 
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public has only an easement passes, the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (1953, as amended 1991). Accordingly, Utah law has 
always provided and remains consistent that land bounded by a street when a transfer is 
made passes title to the center of the street. The properties in the present appeal are 
bounded by property which used to be a street. 
As this court ruled in Nelson, the parties do not dispute "that the metes and bounds 
of each subsequent conveyance ran to the Roadway but did not specifically exclude it." 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35-36. Accordingly, when A.O. Smoot originally deeded the 
property to plaintiffs predecessors in interest, on both the north and south boundaries of 
Roadway, the grants ran to the middle of the Roadway by operation of law. Therefore, 
the trial court erred when it ruled that the title to the property should be quieted in Provo 
City. 
III. UPON VACATION OR ABANDONMENT OF THE STREET, THE FEE 
REVERTED TO THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS 
In Nelson this court did not determine the exact interest which Provo City held 
when 900 South was moved. This court only held: 
Here, we determine that whether City's interest was that of a determinable 
fee or fee simple, the interest was held only in trust. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37, fn. 2. Within the City's role as trustee, the City could vacate or 
abandon old 900 South when it determined that a better route for 900 South existed. The 
City could not, however, change the legal consequence of this action, which was that the 
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Roadway reverted to the abutting property owners. The City breached its fiduciary duties 
when the City attempted to deed property which it did not own. After the decision to 
move 900 South was reached and traffic was no longer upon old 900 South, the City as 
trustee no longer had any interest in the Roadway. 
The public only had an easement upon 900 South. Prior to the grant of 1871 all 
parties agree that 900 South already existed. All parties also agree that at the time of the 
grant, when Utah was still a territory of the United States, the land upon which 900 South 
was situated was owned by the United States. Thus, the public had but an easement to 
travel thereupon. The grant in 1871 did not change this fundamental interest. A.O. 
Smoot only transferred property to the abutting landowners; the city received no deed, nor 
did the City reserve the Roadway. The underlying reversionary interest was granted to 
the abutting landowners long before 1989. The City's interest, whether or not held in 
trust, expired when old 900 South was no longer used as a roadway. 
The trial court even recognized if all the City had was an easement, plaintiffs 
theory upon which they maintained a right to a quiet title would prevail. The trial court 
stated: "The Court believes that Plaintiffs' argument would have merit if the City and the 
collective occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use 
the road." (R. 238). With the correct law applied, including this court's determinations 
in Nelson, plaintiffs' position must prevail. Title must be quieted in the plaintiffs. 
Many of the principles upon which the above stated conclusions are based are 
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already the law of this case. Further, a review of this court's decision in F alula Farms, 
Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993)1 illustrates many of these principles. In 
Falula Farms this court was faced with a quiet title action where a party who owned 
property abutting a roadway wished to develop that property. However, in order to 
develop the property, the party wanted to move the roadway further onto its property. An 
exchange occurred where the party deeded the land to the county for the new road and the 
county in turn deeded the old roadway to the developer party. Essentially, this is exactly 
what happened in the present matter; Provo City moved the Roadway to the South and 
attempted to deed what had been the Roadway to another third party. 
In Falula Farms this court held that the county's attempted conveyance was void 
and this court further quieted title in one-half of the roadway to the abutting landowner. 
This court explained: 
Common law principles regarding highways, roads, and public rights-of-
way prescribe that the public obtains only an easement in a highway or road 
dedicated for public use. [Citation omitted] Furthermore, at common law 
the owner of land which abutted a highway owned up to the middle of the 
highway. [Citation omitted] Thus, common law principles gave the public, 
represented by local government, no more than an easement in land 
dedicated as a public highway or road. Consequently, when a city or 
county abandoned or vacated a dedicated highway or road, the 
abutting landowners owned and possessed the underlying property to 
the middle of the highway or road. 
Id. at 571 (emphasis added). In Falula Farms, this court held: 
!This case was previously briefed in Nelson prior to this court rendering the decision in 
Falula Farms (December 2, 1993). 
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[T]he County lost that [defeasible fee] in 1969 when it vacated part of the 
roadway by moving it twenty-two feet to the west. Consequently, the fee 
simple title to the vacated strip of land reverted to [the abutting landowner]. 
. . . From that point on, [the abutting landowner] held the fee simple 
absolute title and enjoyed the exclusive right to use and control the twenty-
two foot strip of land. 
Id. at 571 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Provo City has de facto vacated, or more clearly abandoned old 900 
South. Provo City even argued to the trial court that old 900 South had been de facto 
vacated. Provo City argued "there has been a de facto vacation of the street[.]" (R. 166). 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs as abutting landowners own and should possess the underlying 
property. Therefore, this court must remand this matter to the trial court with instructions 
to quiet title in the plaintiffs. 
This conclusion is further supported by the landmark decision of Sears v. Ogden 
City. 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). In Sears, the Board of Education of Ogden obtained 
two city blocks along 29th Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. The 
Board of Education requested that the street be vacated by Ogden City. The street was 
vacated and conveyed by quit claim deed to the Board of Education. Plaintiffs, property 
owners in the area, filed a Complaint to enjoin the closing of the street. Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
This court has held that the interests a municipal body acquires in the streets 
in a platted subdivision is a determinable fee. Upon vacation by the 
governing authorities, the fee reverts to the abutting property owners. 
Sears. 572 P.2d at 1359 (citing White v. Salt Lake Citv, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210 
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(Utah 1952)). "Since the Board was the sole abutting property owner along the vacated 
street, the fee interest would revert thereto without a deed from the city." Sears, 572 P.2d 
at 1363. The court in Sears further analyzed the case by providing: 
When the Board acquired the fee to the land abutting the street, there was a 
presumption that the conveyance included the fee to the highway center line 
subject to the public right of way (determinable fee). 
Sears at 1369 N.9 (citing Fenton v. Cedar Lumber & Hardware Co.. 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 
P.2d 966 (Utah 1965)). 
Upon passage of the ordinance vacating the street, the city no longer had 
any title or interest in the premises; and, therefore, the city had nothing to 
sell or convey and the quit claim deed as a nullity as to any interest in the 
roadway dedicated in Argonne Park Plat. Payne v. City of Larame, Wy., 
398 P.2d 557, 562 (Wyo. 1965). 
When a street is vacated and the municipality does not own the underlying 
fee, the municipality has no proprietary interest in the property and is not 
entitled to compensation. Puget Sound Alumni of Campus Signa v. City of 
Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 222, 422 P.2d 799 (Wash. 1967)[.] 
Sears, at 1363. 
This well established legal doctrine is completely on point. When Provo City no 
longer used 900 South as a street and either impliedly vacated it or abandons its use, the 
city no longer had any legal interest in the northern one-half of the street as it reverted to 
the plaintiffs herein as the successors of the original grantees. 
In the present circumstances, this court must continue to hold that there was no 
clear intent to exclude the Roadway from the initial grant in this case, just as this court 
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did in Nelson. See Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35-36. As the facts indicate, at the time the grants 
were made to Plaintiffs predecessors, the road was already being used by the public. At 
no time prior to the grants on both sides of the road did any person own the land which 
makes up the Roadway. 
The grant to Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest conveys the property with no 
express reservation. The deed states that the property is conveyed to "James Dunn, his 
heirs and assigns forever the foregoing described land with all rights, privileges and 
appurtenances thereto belonging or in any way appertaining." By common law, the 
appurtenances would include the interest up to the middle of the Roadway. 
Both original deeds to the north and south parcels contain provisions including 
"appurtenances" to the described land. An appurtenance is defined by Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th ed.) as "that which belongs to something else; an adjunct; an appendage. 
Something annexed to another thing more worthy as principle, and which passes as 
incident to i t . . . see also appendant." Appendant is defined as " a thing annexed to or 
belonging to another thing in passing with it. Something added or attached . . . " 
The roadway between the Stubbs' addition and the First Ward Pasture was omitted 
from all deeds. It was never claimed by Provo City pursuant to the Township Act. More 
importantly, the city nor any other party every received an interest to the property by deed. 
Thus, there was no intent of the parties to the conveyance which would indicate that they 
meant to exclude the roadway. The conveyance of the real property at issue in this action 
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is presumed to have passed title to the center of the roadway. When the city impliedly 
vacated or abandoned the property, the public easement was extinguished and title to the 
center of the roadway reverted to the plaintiffs. 
IV. THE CITY DID NOT HOLD A FEE INTEREST 
This court held in Nelson: 
Landowners claim that City could not acquire title to 900 South under the 
patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a deed. 
We agree. 
In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any other 
claimant would have to obtain a deed. 
Here, the parties agree that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway or 
obtained a deed to the Roadway. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37. In other words, the City never acquired title. As a result, the trial 
court's ruling that "the fact that the City held title to the land on which the Roadway was 
located (albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that the Roadway was not a road made 
pursuant to the grant of easement which would carry with it a reversionary interest," 
cannot possibly be sustained. 
Defendants have claimed that the property pursuant to the deed received from the 
President of the United States pursuant to "an act of Congress for the release of 
inhabitants of cities and towns upon the public lands." That act provided that the town 
corporate authorities, or a county court judge, could enter the proper United States Land 
Office and aquire the property at a minimum price. The property could then be deeded: 
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In trust for the several use and benefit and use of the occupants thereof, 
according to their respective interest; the execution of which trust, as to the 
disposal of the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, are 
to be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by 
the legislative authority of the state or territory in which the same may be 
situated. 
An Act of Congress for the Relief of the Inhabitants of the Cities and Towns Upon Public 
Lands. March 2, 1867. 
The rules and regulations prescribed by the legislative authority or territory are 
apparently codified in Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-1 et sec. The Township Acts as provisions 
for land reserved for public use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-17 and all predecessor versions of the statute provide: 
Reservation of land for public uses. 
Lots or parcels of land necessary for streets, public squares . . . or public 
use, may be reserved by the city commissioners, the mayor, the president of 
the board of trustees, or the district judge, as the case may be; and he may 
execute and deliver to the proper party a deed for any property set aside for 
such purpose. 
Provo City did not reserve this street for public uses. More importantly, Provo City as 
this court earlier recognized, failed to obtain a deed for the property either pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-17 or pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-8. Simply stated, 
Defendants are not deeded owners of the land underlying the roadway. 
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V. THE INTEREST HELD BY PROVO CITY WAS AN EASEMENT OR A 
DETERMINABLE FEE 
At the time of the original conveyances, a fee simple estate and right in lands could 
only be taken for public use when: (1) the property was taken for public buildings or 
grounds, or (2) for permanent buildings, or (3) for reservoirs and dams, and permanent 
flooding occasioned thereby, or (4) for an outlet for a flow, or place for the deposit of 
debris or tailing of a mine. Common Laws of Utah § 1106.1 (1884). As a result, Provo 
City could not have obtained an absolute interest in the Roadway. 
Although the Court of Appeals in Nelson held that Provo City did not have a fee 
simple absolute interest in the property, the trial court nonetheless held that such interest 
existed. However, the statutory laws in effect at the time of the grant precluded a 
municipality from owning the property in fee simple absolute. This legal conclusion 
leads to the result in this matter. First, since the municipality could not hold fee simple, 
the trial court below must as a matter of law be in error in claiming thait the city could 
hold fee simple. Second, the fact that the statutory laws would not allow a municipality to 
hold property in fee simple title leads to the only conclusion that the original conveyance 
to the plaintiffs' predecessors was intended to convey to the center of the road. 
The Utah Supreme Court in construing the predecessor statute of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-5-4, stated as follows: 
While the word "fee" is used in this section, it is clear from what follows 
that it is not intended that the fee of the corpus or land itself should pass, 
but only the fee to the service, and this only for public use for all purposes 
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of a street or highway. The fee mentioned in the statute was thus what is 
known as limited or determinable fee, and was created for a special purpose 
or purposes only, and hence was subject of abandonment. Sowadski v. Salt 
Lake County. 36 Utah 127, 104 P.2d 111,116. 
The City of Provo has clearly demonstrated the intent and desire to abandon old 900 
South. Provo City (1) moved 900 South, (2) discontinued any public use of the property, 
(3) attempted to vacate the property by city ordinance, and (4) attempted to deed the 
property to a third party. 
Moreover, once a public highway has been established pursuant to § 27-12-89, it 
remains a public highway unless expressly abandoned by the proper authorities. In the 
present circumstances, an express abandonment has occurred. Provo City has attempted 
to deed this property to a third party who has no connection with the city. Provo City 
attempted to vacate the street, upon which vacation the property would have reverted to 
the abutting landowners, further evidencing their clear intent to abandon the property. In 
fact, abandonment took place when the roadway was rerouted by the city. 
In Brown v. Oregon Short Liner Railroad Co., 102 P. 740, 742 (Utah 1909), the 
court held: 
An easement may be extinguished by an act of the owner of the easement 
which is incompatible with the existence of the right claim. If the owner of 
the easement himself obstructs it in a manner inconsistent with its further 
enjoinment, or permits the owner of a subservient estate to do so, the 
easement will be considered abandoned. 
In the present circumstances, not only has Provo moved the road so that it no longer 
remains on the property, but Provo City has taken the further step of deeding the property 
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to a developer where now a Taco Bell restaurant sits. A more clear example of 
abandonment could not exist. 
The Supreme Court recognized this expressly in White v. Salt Lake City. 239 P.2d 
210 (Utah 1952), wherein the court adopted Sowadski and provided: 
If the governing authorities are satisfied that neither the public interest nor 
any person will be materially injured, a petition to vacate shall be granted. 
In such event the "limited and determinable fee" spoken of in the Sowadski 
case would then revert to the abutting property owner. 
White at 213. The court in White went on to state: 
If the street should cease to serve any public interest, it may be abandoned, 
and, in that case, the right to the use and control of the roadway would 
revert to the abutting owning pursuant to 36-1-7 and common law 
principles. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the Federal Townsite Act in Hall v. North 
Ogden City, 175 P.2d 703 (Utah 1946). HaU addresses and lays forth the history, purpose 
and intent of the Townsite Act of 1867. At the time of this Townsite Act it was felt that 
the ownership of land fell into two categories, those being of equitable ownership and 
bare legal title. The Hall court recognized that equitable ownership of Ihe land was held 
by the inhabitants, whereas bare legal title to the land was held by the United States of 
America. The purpose of the Act was to merge bare legal title with equitable title in the 
inhabitants in order to create fee simple absolute title to the occupants of the land. The 
statute was never intended to be construed as the trial court did below that the Townsite 
act would merge the title in the city or municipality. 
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The Federal Townsite Act provided in pertinent part that the land could be 
conveyed by the United States of America to a trustee: 
. . . for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to 
their respective interest; the execution of which trust . . . to be conducted 
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative 
authority of the state or territory in which the same may be situated . . . and 
provided, further that any act of said treaties, not made in conformity to the 
rules and regulations herein eluded to shall be void[.] 
Hall v. North Qgden City, 175 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1946). Provo City's attempt to sell 
property to which they did not have title was a void act. As soon as the property was 
abandoned, Provo City no longer had any interest in the property. As trustee, the City had 
exercised all possible control over the property when the original land grant occurred over 
100 years ago. When A.O. Smoot failed to reserve the property and obtain a deed, the 
possible actions of the municipality as trustee were limited. Provo City's current attempt 
to change the legal consequence of its actions constitutes a breach of its fiduciary duties. 
The trial court should have ruled on remand that Provo City's only possible course of 
action was to aquiese in title being quieted in plaintiffs. 
VI. TITLE IN PROVO CITY WOULD BE VOID UNDER THE TOWNSITE 
ACT 
The patent from the U.S. government to A.O. Smoot, in trust, conveyed only bare 
legal title to the land. At the time the trust was created, the occupants were the 
beneficiaries under the trust and also were the equitable owners of the land being 
occupied. The trustee had the duty to convey legal title to the occupants of the land in 
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order to merge legal title and equitable title. Conveyance by the trustee of bare legal title 
to the person not occupying the land constitutes a breach of a trust and the conveyance is 
void. Hail, 175 P.2dat 709. 
In the present circumstances, the court has been confused about the status of the 
land whereupon 900 South used to exist. After A.O. Smoot conveyed the property to 
those abutting property owners, there was nothing left to convey. All that was left was 
the adjoining property owners now having fee simple absolute, and a determinable fee 
existing in the street. 
Since the road 900 South abutted the property of Plaintiffs' predecessors, actual 
title in the roadway was in Dunn on the north and in the First Ward Pasture Company on 
the south. Provo City never fulfilled any requirements to hold any title in the roadway. 
Provo City has now abandoned its claim to the road and currently has no underlying 
interest. Any claim that Provo City received its interest by and through A.O. Smoot is 
therefore void as provided in the Federal Townsite Act. 
Finally, it should be noted that there are substantial similarities between Hall v. 
North Ogden City and the present case. In Hall, plaintiffs obtained property under the 
Townsite Act which was platted with streets and highways. The streets and highways 
were never opened. North Ogden City then sought to claim ownership of the streets 
pursuant to the plats and federal land grant. In Hall the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
streets had been abandoned and ownership reverted to the Halls who owned equitable title 
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to the property. 
Likewise, in the present case Provo City claims ownership of the city street which 
has been vacated and/or abandoned. Provo City does not own the underlying title. As in 
Hall, the interest in the property should revert to the abutting landowners, the plaintiffs 
herein. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court must reverse and remand the trial court's 
holding and title must be quieted in the plaintiffs. 
DATED AND SIGNED this [U^ day of November, 1999. 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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last day shall fall on a Sunday, Christmas day, or on any day appointed 
by the President of the United States as a day of public fast or thanks-
giving, or on the Fourth of July, in which case the time shall be reckoned 
exclusive of that day also. 
SEC. 49. And be it further enacted, That all the jurisdiction, power, Jurisdiction of 
and authority conferred upon and vested in the District Court of the United States 
United States by this act in cases in bankruptcy are hereby conferred f ^ c t ^ f Co-
upon and vested in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and Jnmbia and Ter-
in and upon the supreme courts of the several Territories of the United n tones. 
States, when the bankrupt resides in the said District of Columbia or in 
either of the said Territories. And in those judicial districts which are j n districts not 
not within any organized circuit of the United States, the power and in organized cir-
jurisdiction of a circuit court in bankruptcy may be exercised by the eSercwe^wer 
district judge. of circuit court. 
SEC. 50. And be it further enacted, That this act shall commence and When act to 
take effect as to the appointment of the officers created hereby, and the toke effecL 
promulgation of rules and general orders, from and after the date of its 
approval: Pi-ovided, That no petition or other proceeding under this act Proviso, 
shall be filed, received, or commenced before the first day of June, anno 
Domini, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven. 
APPROVED, March 2, 1867. 
CHAP. CLXXVIL — An Act for the Relief of the Inhabitants of Cities and Totcns March 2,1867.' 
upon the Public Lands. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever any portion of . ^ T11 an^hori' 
the public lands of the United States have been or shall be settled upon enter public 
and occupied as a town site, and therefore not subject to entry under the lands occupied 
agricultural pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such town shall "intraum price' 
be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and if not incorpor- in trust, &c. 
ated, for the judge of the county court for the county in which such town 
may be situated, to enter at the proper land office, and at the minimum 
price, the land so settled and occupied, in trust for the several use and 
benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests; 
the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, Trust, how 
and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules executed, 
and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the 
State or Territory in which the same may be situated: Provided, That 
the entry of the land intended by this act to be made shall be made, or a Entry, &c. 
declaratory statement of the purpose of the inhabitants to enter it as a whentobe 
town site under this act shall be filed with the register of the proper land ' 
office, prior to the commencement of the public sale of the body of land 
in which it is included, and that the entry or declaratory statement shall *° include 
include only such lands as is actually occupied by the town and the title ' 
to which is in the United States. If upon surveyed lands the entry shall upon sur-
in its exterior limit be made in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the ^i^o^fa^l 
public lands authorized by the act of twenty-fourth April, one thousand Vol. iii. p. 666 
eight hundred and twenty ; and where the inhabitants are in number one 
hundred and less than two hundred, shall embrace not exceeding three 
hundred and twenty acres; and in cases where the inhabitants of such Amount of 
town are more than two hundred and less than one thousand, shall em- 1&nd tthj£dma3r 
brace not exceeding six hundred and forty acres; and where the number 
of inhabitants is one thousand and over one thousand, shall embrace not 
exceediug twelve hundred and eighty acres: Provided^ That for each ad- Proviso, 
ditional one thousand inhabitants, not exceeding five thousand in ail, a 
further grant of three hundred and twenty acres shall be allowed: And Where tnere 
provided fuHher, That in any Territory in which a land office may not [ ^ " 1 ° ^ 
have been established, declaratory statements as hereinbefore provided filed where. 
542 THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS. SESS. IL CH. 177, 178, 179. 1867. 
may be filed with the surveyor-general of the surveying district in which 
the lands are situate, who shall transmit said declaratory statement to the 
Certain acts general land office: And provided, further, That any act of said trus-
of ^ trustees to be
 t e e s n o t m a ( j e -lQ conf0rmity to the rules and regulations herein alluded to 
Regulations, shall be void ; effect to be given to the foregoing provisions accordlug to 
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior: 
This act not And provided further. That the provisions of this act shall not apply to 
to apply to cer-
 militarr or other reservations heretofore made by the United State>, nor 
tain reserva- * . , 
tions; to reservations for lighthouses, custom-houses, mints, or such other public 
purposes as the interests of the United States may require, whether held 
under reservations through the land office by title derived from the Crown 
nor to mines of Spain, or otherwise: And provided further, That no title shall be ac-
of /told, &c. quired, under the provisions of this act, to any mine of gold, silver, cinna-
bar, or copper. 
APPROVED, March 2, 1867. 
March 2, 1867. CHAP. CLXXVIIL — An Act allowing the Duties on foreign Merchandise imported 
into the Port of Albany to be secured and paid at that Place. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
Albany, New States of America in Congress assembled, That Albany, in the State of 
port of delivery. New York, and within the collection district of New York, b<2, and is 
hereby, declared to be a port of delivery within the aforesaid district; and 
Surveyor. there shall be appointed a surveyor of customs, to reside at Baid port, who 
shall, in addition to the customary duties performed by that officer in 
1831, ch. 87. other places, perform the duties prescribed in an act entitled "An act al-
O.IT. p. 4 . jo wjng (h e fore,*gn merchandise imported into Pittsburg, Wheeling, Cin-
cinnati, Louisville, Saint Louis, Nashville, and Natchez, to be secured 
and paid at those places," approved March two, eighteen hundred and 
Bond,fees,and thirty-one. ' The said surveyor, before taking the oath of office, shall give 
*' security to the United States for the faithful performance of his duties in 
the sum of ten thousand dollars, and shall receive, in addition to the cus-
tomary fees and emoluments of his office, an annual salary of six hundred 
dollars. 
Privileges and SEC. 2* And be it further enacted, That the same privileges granted to 
^wble.008 E?" t h e Po r t s o f d e l i v e i 7 mentioned in the first section of this act. and the 
restrictions created by the said act, are hereby extended and made appli-
cable to all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United 
States at any port of entry and destined to said port of Albany. 
Privileges of SEC. 3. And be it further enacted,, That the Secretary of the Treasury 
I^^fL^ll' ft*L shall he, and he is hereby, authorized to extend the privileges of the extended to in is 7 - J; . , » J J • » / • • • ! • » # » 
port. warehouse acts of August six, eighteen hundred and forty-six, and Marco 
184«, ch. 84. twenty-eight, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, and the regulations of th€ 
1854,lcii.P30.3' Treasury Department relating thereto, to the said port of Albany. 
Vol. x. p. 270. APPROVED, March 2,1867. 
March 2,1867. CHAP. CLXXIX. — An Act to create the Office of Surveyor-General in the Territory c 
Montana, and establish a Land Office in the Territories of Montana and Arizona. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Unit* 
Snrveyor-gen- States of America in Congress assembled, That the President, by the ad 
or ontana. ^.^
 a n £ c o n g e n t 0f th e Senate, shall be, and he is hereby, authorized t 
Salary and du-appoint a surveyor-general for Montana, whose annual salary shall b 
tics
- three thousand dollars, and whose power, authority, and duties shall b 
the same as those provided by law for the surveyor-general of Oregoi 
office rented ^ e BDa^ D f t v e Pr0Per allowances for clerk hire, office rent and fuel, whi 
fuel. ' b now allowed by law to the surveyor-general of Oregon. 
Montana and SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the public lands within tl 
o s^toicueatab- Territories of Montana and Arizona, to which the Indian title is or sha 
lisbed. be extinguished, shall each respectively constitute a new land district 
57-7-1 REAL ESTATE 
another, may remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such real 
estate, at any time before he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have the 
benefit of this chapter by proceeding as herein directed. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2028; 





57-7-1. Disposition of lots to persons enti-
tled after entry. 
57-7-2. Notice of entry. 
57-7-3. Claims to lots to be filed — Time 
and place. 
57-7-4. Adverse claims — Determination. 
57-7-5. Proof of claims when no adverse 
claim advanced. 
57-7-6. Conveyance and deed to proper 
claimant. 
57-7-7. When judge is claimant of lands. 
57-7-8. When city or town officer is claim-
ant of lands. 
57-7-9. Change of venue. 
57-7-10. Statement of expenses. 











Full payment to be made within 
six months — Lien for nonpay-
ment — Sale to satisfy. 
Errors in measurement or compu-
tation. 
Death of officer — Authority to 
complete trust vests in succes-
sor. 
Disposition of unclaimed lands. 
Sale of unclaimed lands. 
Reservation of lands for public 
uses. 
Disposition of proceeds of sales. 
Possession for ten years entitles 
claimant to conveyance. 
57-7-1. Disposition of lots to persons entitled after entry. 
When the corporate authorities of any city or town, or the district judge of 
any county in which any city or town may be situated, shall have entered at the 
proper land office the land or any part of the land settled and occupied as the 
site of such city or town pursuant to and by virtue of the provisions of the Act 
of Congress entitled "An act for the relief of the inhabitants of cities and towns 
upon the public lands," approved March 2, 1867, and acts amendatory thereof 
and supplementary thereto, it shall be the duty of such corporate authorities 
or judge, as the case may be, to dispose of and convey the title to such land, or 
to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares thereof, to the persons entitled 
thereto, who shall be ascertained as hereinafter prescribed. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2071; 
C.L. 1917, § 6121; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 94-
0-1. 
Federal Law. — The federal act referred to 
in this section is the Tbwnsite Act of 1867, 
which does not appear in U.S.C. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of entry. 
—Trust for benefit of occupants. 
Entry by mayor. 
Effect of entry. 
—Trust for benefit of occupants . 
The corporate authorities or judge who en-
ters the lands as provided by this section holds 
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27-12401 HIGHWAYS 
state to so do. All moneys received for such leases and rentals, after 
deducting any portion to which the federal government may be entitled, 
shall be deposited with the state treasurer and credited to the state road 
fund. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 100. 
27-12-101. Title to property acquired by state. Title to real property 
acquired by the State Road Commission or the counties, cities and towns, 
either by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, 
for highway rights-of-way or other highway purposes, may be in fee simple 
or any lesser estate or interest. A transfer of land bounded by a public 
highway on a right-of-way for which the public has only an easement 
passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle 
of the highway. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101. 
Cross-References. 
Fee vested by dedication of streets by plat, 
57-5-4. 
Public vacation of street property. 
Where city vacated street property which 
was never used by the public and never 
platted as a street on the official records, the 
parties owning the land abutting on either 
side of such property were entitled to fee 
simple interests to the center line of the 
"street," where the grantor who deeded the 
street property to the city was also the 
grantor of the abutting landowners, and no 
intention to the contrary appeared in any of 
the original deeds. Fenton v. Cedar Lbr. & 
Hardware Co. (1965) 17 U 2d 99, 404 P 2d 966. 
Construction and application. 
Repealed section providing that public, by 
taking or accepting land for highway, 
acquired only the right-of-way and incidents 
necessary to enjoying and maintaining it was 
merely declaratory of the common law, and 
had no application to creation of private as 
distinguished from public easement. Brown v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co. (1909) 36 U 257, 102 
P 740, 24 LRA (NS) 86. 
Title and right of public and abutting 
owners. 
City still owned fee to strip, acquired 
under Townsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq.), 
after alleged dedication thereof as public 
Title and right of public and abutting 
owners. 
Erection of electric power lines on public 
highway right-of-way, the fee to which is not 
in the public but in the owner of the abutting 
property, is within the purview of the ease-
ment for highway purposes and is not an 
additional servitude for which the abutting 
owner is entitled to compensation. Pickett v. 
California Pac. Utilities (1980) 619 P 2d 325. 
Collateral References. 
Highways <£= 80. 
39A CJS Highways § 136. 
39 AmJur 2d 531, Highways, Streets, and 
Bridges § 158. 
Description with reference to highway as 
carrying title to center or side of highway, 49 
ALR 2d 982. 
Property rights of abutting owners in trees 
cut or removed from street or highway, 9 
ALR 1269. 
street, so that only right that public could 
have acquired would be right to easement 
across strip for traveling purposes, and only 
additional right contiguous property owners 
might acquire would be right of ingress to 
and egress from their property. Premium Oil 
Co. v. Cedar City (1947) 112 U 324, 187 P 2d 
199. 
Statutes regulating water mains in rela-
tion to highways clearly indicated that legis-
lature did not regard dedication of a street 
in a platted subdivision as the surrender of 
an easement with retention of the fee in the 
abutting owner. White v. Salt Lake City 
(1952) 121 U 134, 239 P 2d 210. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
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APPENDIX B 
Boyd NELSON, Lorraine Nelson, Steven 
Whitlock, and Sheila Whitlock, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Cite as 872 P.2d 35 (UtahApp. 1994) 
3. Municipal Corporations <3>657(7) 
When municipality has but a determin-
able fee and does not own underlying fee 
simple to roadway, vacation of roadway re-
sults in fee reverting to abutting landowners. 
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 930227-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1994. 
Following city's purported vacation of 
roadway, abutting landowners brought suit 
seeking to establish their reversionary inter-
ests to middle of road. City counterclaimed 
for quiet title to roadway. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J., entered final judgment awarding legal and 
equitable title of roadway to city, and abut-
ting landowners appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Davis, J., held that: (1) city did not 
acquire fee simple title to dedicated roadway 
by virtue of Federal Townsite Act, but held 
roadway only in trust, with corresponding 
fiduciary duties to collective occupants of 
city, and (2) city did not properly vacate 
roadway, even assuming that it could do so in 
its capacity as trustee. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Dedication <2>53 
City did not acquire fee simple title to 
dedicated roadway by virtue of Federal 
Townsite Act, and could not acquire such 
title unless it reserved roadway for public 
use by obtaining a deed; until such time, city 
held roadway in trust only, with correspond-
ing fiduciary duties to occupants of town. 
U.C.A.1953, 57-7-3, 57-7-17; 43 U.S.C.(1970 
Ed.) § 718. 
2. Municipal Corporations <£*657(7) 
Even assuming that city could properly 
vacate roadway which it held only in trust for 
occupants of city, any interest that city held 
after vacating roadway would still be held in 
trust, and not in absolute ownership. 
4. Municipal Corporations 0657(7) 
When municipality owns underlying fee 
to roadway, proper vacation of roadway 
would not change municipality's right to un-
derlying fee. 
5. Municipal Corporations 0657(5) 
Roadway was not properly vacated, 
where city failed to notify abutting landown-
ers, or to notify its citizens generally pursu-
ant to statute until after purported vacation. 
U.C.A.1953, 10-8-8.4. 
James G. Clark (argued), Provo, for appel-
lants. 
Gary Gregerson, Provo City Atty., and 
David Dixon, Asst. City Atty. (argued), Pro-
vo, for appellee. 




Appellants (Landowners) appeal a final 
judgment concluding that appellee Provo 
City (City) holds legal and equitable title (fee 
simple) to the portion of 900 South between 
100 East and University Avenue (Roadway) 
abutting Landowners' property. We reverse 
and remand. 
Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 
1869, the federal government deeded the 
Roadway along with the abutting lands in 
trust to the local municipal authority, Provo 
Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee (the 
Townsite Conveyance). The Roadway exist-
ed as a public thoroughfare prior to this 
conveyance. The parties do not dispute that 
Landowners' predecessors in interest did not 
occupy the Roadway or the abutting proper-
ty at the time of the Townsite Conveyance. 
Nor do they dispute that the metes and 
bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to 
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the Roadway but did not specifically exclude 
it. 
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the 
Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876 deed-
ed the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a 
portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to 
appellants Stephen Whitlock and Sheila 
Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone 
received another portion of the Stubbs par-
cel. Finally, in 1991, appellants Boyd Nelson 
and Lorraine Nelson received a deed for 
another portion of the Stubbs parcel. 
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the 
Roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of 
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, 
First Ward Pasture Company deeded its par-
cel to City. 900 South continued to be used 
as a public roadway. 
In its regularly scheduled meeting of Au-
gust 22, 1989, the Provo Municipal Council 
passed ordinance number 0-89-055, which 
purported to vacate and set aside the Road-
way. After passing the ordinance, City pub-
lished notice one time in the Provo Daily 
Herald on August 31, 1989. City mailed no 
notice of the vacation to the abutting land-
owners either before or after the fact. City 
then rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the 
property it owned to the south of the original 
route and sold the vacated portion of the 
original route to a commercial developer. 
The vacation of the Roadway landlocked one 
lot and deprived two other lots of access to 
900 South. 
Landowners sued City claiming a rever-
sionary interest in the Roadway from their 
property lines to the middle of the Roadwray. 
They sought compensation and, in the alter-
native, the setting aside of the vacation. 
City counterclaimed for quiet title to the 
Roadway. 
On July 6, 1992, the trial court quieted title 
in City as against Landowners, concluding 
that City held fee simple title since the time 
of the Townsite Conveyance. Landowners 
moved for specific findings regarding City's 
compliance with the Townsite Act and with 
the State Township Act. The trial court 
CITY'S INTEREST IN ROADWAY 
Landowners claim the court erred in con-
cluding the Townsite Conveyance conveyed a 
fee simple interest to City because (1) the 
patent, when read in context of the Townsite 
Act, conveyed the Roadway to City in trust 
only, and (2) City failed to reserve the Road-
way for public use pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-7-8 or -17 (1990). 
United States Patent 
[1] In 1867, the United States Congress 
passed the Townsite Act, also known as "An 
Act of Congress for the Relief of the Inhabit-
ants of the Cities and Towns upon Public 
Lands." Federal Townsite Act, ch. 177, 14 
Stat. 541 (1867), codified as 43 U.S.C. § 718, 
repealed by P.L. 94-579, Title VII, § 703(a), 
90 Stat. 2789 (1973). This act enabled town 
corporate authorities, as trustees, to acquire 
federally-owned property for their towns. 
The property was acquired 
in trust for the several use and benefit and 
use of the occupants thereof, according to 
their respective interests; the execution of 
which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in 
such town, and the proceeds of the sales 
thereof, to be conducted under such rules 
and regulations as may be prescribed by 
the legislative authority of the State or 
Territory in which the same may be situat-
ed. 
Id. 
The Townsite Act limited townsite lands to 
those "actually occupied by the town and the 
title to which is in the United States." Id. 
The Townsite Act provided that the local 
legislative authority could make regulations 
for the disposition of the townsite lands. Id. 
However, "any act of said trustees not made 
in conformity to the rules and regulations 
herein alluded to shall be void." Id. See 
Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175 
P.2d 703, 705 (1946). 
Conveyances pursuant to the Townsite Act 
transferred title to town authorities in trust 
for the collective occupants: Conversely, 
town authorities could not hold the land as 
purchasers.1 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
TWnm'tp Act to mean that conveyances 
nriJUOV/l1* V. 1 1VU T V V ; I H 
Cite as 872 P.2d 35 
thereunder served to transfer equitable own-
ership of a parcel of land to an occupant only 
if the parcel was occupied at the time of 
transfer. Hall, 175 P.2d at 705. Hall does 
not address the issue before us: whether a 
municipality has fee simple to a dedicated 
roadway where the abutting land was unoc-
cupied at the time the town acquired it.2 
Still, the language of the Townsite Act is 
clear that conveyances thereunder served to 
transfer land in trust to the municipality as 
trustee and not as absolute owner. 
Disposing Legislation 
Landowners claim that City could not ac-
quire title to 900 South under the patent 
unless Smoot reserved the street for public 
use by obtaining a deed. We agree. 
The Townsite Act provided that the local 
legislative authority could make regulations 
for the disposition of the townsite lands and 
"any act of said trustees not made in con-
formity to the rules and regulations herein 
alluded to shall be void." 43 U.S.C. § 718. 
Utah's disposing legislation is found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-7-1 to -19 (1990). 
Section 57-7-17 of the current code, and 
all predecessor statutes, provides as follows: 
Lots or parcels of land necessary for 
streets . . . may be reserved by the city 
commissioners, the mayor, the president of 
the board of trustees or the district judge, 
as the case may be; and he [or she] may 
authorities could not purchase the land, but must 
hold it in trust for the collective occupants: 
Mr. Howard: Does the Senator from Califor-
nia mean to be understood that this bill pro-
vides that the corporate authorities of the town 
may become the purchasers? Is that the 
scheme here? 
Mr. Conness: No, sir. 
Mr. Howard: I so understood him. 
Mr. Conness: They simply enter the land as 
agents in trust for the occupants, those in 
possession. 
Mr. Howard: Do they get a title? 
Mr. Conness: A title for the occupants from 
the United States. 
Mr. Howard: Then they become the owners in 
trust. 
Mr. Conness: In trust. That is it exactly. 
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1109 
(1867). 
2
- City cites Loeber v. Butte General Electric, 16 
Mont. 1, 39 P. 912 (1895) for the proposition that 
the municipality holds fee simple title as absolute 
(UtahApp. 1994) 
execute and deliver to the propef party a 
deed for any property set aside for such 
purposes. 
Section 57-7-8 provides: 
If a city commissioner or the mayor of 
any city or the president of the board of 
trustees of any town shall be a claimant of 
lands in such city or town, the recorder or 
the clerk thereof, as the case may be, shall, 
upon the certificate of the district court 
made as in the case of other claimants, 
execute a deed of conveyance to such 
claimant for the lands finally adjudged to 
him [or her] by the court. 
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the 
stated disposing legislation, provide that a 
townsite conveyance transferred land to a 
municipality in trust. In order for the mu-
nicipality to own the land for itself, it, like 
any other claimant, would have to obtain a 
deed. 
Here, the parties agree that City never 
explicitly reserved the Roadway or obtained 
a deed to the Roadway pursuant to section 
57-7-8 or -17. Thus, City remains holder of 
the Roadway in trust. City purported to 
vacate the Roadway as absolute owner, with-
out regard to its responsibilities as trustee or 
the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we 
remand this matter to the trial court to 
consider City's role as trustee of the Road-
way, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries, in this case, the collective occu-
pants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718. 
owner to a street derived from a townsite convey-
ance. In Loeber, the disputed alley had been 
included in the original townsite survey and the 
abutting land had been occupied at the time of 
the townsite transfer. The issue of whether the 
municipality held the alley in fee simple or as a 
determinable fee was not before the court. The 
court held that because the alley in question had 
been dedicated to public use before the convey-
ance of the lot, the abutting landowner "was not 
the owner in fee of the alley" and thus the 
abutting landowner could not complain of the 
installation of electric poles in the alley. Id. 39 
P. at 913. This holding is not helpful to resolu-
tion of this case because it does not resolve 
whether the municipality held a determinable fee 
or an absolute fee in the alley. The municipality 
in Loeber needed only to have held a determin-
able fee or even an easement to permit installa-
tion of the electric poles. 
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DETERMINABLE FEE 
[2] Landowners claim the trial court 
erred in failing to conclude that upon vaca-
tion of the Roadway, the fee to the center 
line of the Roadway would revert to them as 
abutting property owners. 
[3,4] Utah case law relies on common 
law to support the theory that where a mu-
nicipality has but a determinable fee3 and 
does not own the underhing fee simple, the 
vacating of the roadway results in the fee 
reverting to the abutting landowners. Sears, 
572 P.2d at 1363; White v. Salt Lake City, 
121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952); Fa-
lula Farms, 866 P.2d at 571. See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-8.5 (Supp.1993) (vacating 
of public roadway dedicated to public use by 
proprietor terminates city's determinable fee 
therein). Conversely, where a municipality 
owns the underlying fee to a roadway, proper 
vacation of such would not change the munic-
ipality's right to the underlying fee. Sears, 
572 P.2d at 1363. 
While City may hold the Roadway in fee 
simple, that interest is held in trust. Thus, 
even if City as trustee had (or could have) 
properly vacated the Roadway, City's inter-
est would still be held in trust and not in 
absolute ownership. This brings us to 
whether or not City properly vacated the 
Roadway. 
NOTICE TO VACATE 
[5] Landowners claim City did not prop-
erly vacate the Roadway because it did not 
provide proper statutory notice to abutting 
landowners and City's other occupants. 
A municipality may not vacate a street 
unless it has provided proper notice pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8.4 (1992). No-
tice is given "by publishing in a newspaper 
published or of general circulation in such 
city once a week for four consecutive weeks 
preceding action on such petition or intention 
3. A fee simple determinable expires automatical-
ly on the occurrence of a stated event. See 
Black's Law Dictionary 615-16 (6th ed. 1990). 
Thus, where a municipality has a determinable 
fee in a roadway, common law provides that the 
limited fee ends when the roadway is vacated. 
See Falula Farms v. Ludlow. 866 P.2d 569. 571 
. . . and by mailing such notice to all owners 
of record of land abutting the street or alley 
proposed to be vacated " Id. See also 
Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 
1974) (purported vacation of roadway nullity 
where no notice given to abutting landowners 
or general public); Boskovich v. Midvale 
City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435, 437 
(1952) (improper vacation of street and alley 
denied abutting landowners due process); 
Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 
P.2d 406, 407, 410 (Utah 1941) (mayor could 
not quitclaim alley by resolution to abutting 
land owner in contravention of vacation stat-
ute even where land had been deeded to city 
by federal government). 
Here, City did not notify abutting land-
owners, nor did it notify its citizens generally 
pursuant to statute. In fact, the single pub-
lished notice ran after the purported vaca-
tion. Thus, City's notice was not only insuffi-
cient, it was untimely. As a result, any 
purported vacation of the Roadway is a nulli-
ty. See Boskovich, 243 P.2d at 437. We 
therefore reverse the court's conclusion that 
City properly vacated the Roadway and re-
mand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act con-
veyed the Roadway to City in trust only; (2) 
hold that City never explicitly reserved the 
Roadway or obtained a deed to the Roadway 
pursuant to statute; (3) remand for consider-
ation of City's role as trustee of the Road-
way, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries; and (4) reverse the court's de-
termination that City properly vacated the 
Roadway. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
municipality typically obtains a determinable fee 
in roadways when the same are accepted thereby 
pursuant to the final approval of a subdivision 
plat. That was the case in Sears v. Ogden, 572 
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1977). Here, we deter-
mine that whether City's interest was that of a 
determinable fee or a fee simole. the interest was 
Cite as 866 P.2d 569 
inspections. Inspector Malencik testified 
that, in his opinion, there were several addi-
tional steps Hidden Valley could have taken 
to minimize erosion, but did not identify any 
specific steps that Hidden Valley had appar-
ently failed to take during that eighteen-day 
period. The Board made no findings with 
respect to Hidden Valley's alleged failure to 
Aunimize erosion, and there was no evidence 
presented that would have supported such a 
finding. In light of the absence of evidence, 
the Board could not have found that Hidden 
Valley had, between November 1 and No-
vember 19, failed to take all reasonable steps 
to minimize erosion. We therefore conclude 
that the Board erred in upholding this por-
tion of the NOV. 
Failure to Seed and Revegetate 
Disturbed Areas 
The Board found that Hidden Valley 
"failed to comply with the Permanent Pro-
gram standards and the approved Reclama-
tion Plan by having failed to seed the dis-
turbed area constituting the outslopes of the 
access road." Based on this finding, the 
Board upheld that portion of the Division's 
NOV that cited Hidden Valley for failing to 
seed and revegetate disturbed areas. 
There is some dispute in the record as to 
whether Hidden Valley failed to seed and 
revegetate the disturbed areas. However, 
the Division did not introduce any evidence 
that Hidden Valley had failed to meet seed-
ing and revegetating requirements between 
November 1 and November 19. Consequent-
ly, the Division has not supported this por-
tion of the NOV with substantial evidence on 
the record. The Division has not established 
a prima facie showing that Hidden Valley 
had, between November 1 and November 19, 
failed to seed and revegetate all disturbed 
areas at the mine site. In light of the lack of 
record evidence supporting the Division's po-
sition, the Board's decision to uphold this 
portion of the NOV was arbitrary and capri-
cious. We therefore conclude that the Board 
erred in upholding this portion of the NOV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Division failed to establish a prima 
facie showing of the facts underlying the 
(UtahApp. 1993) 
violations charged in the NOV. We there-
fore reverse the Board's decision upholding 
the Division's issuance of the NOV and va-
cate the Division's penalty assessment 
against Hidden Valley. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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Plaintiff Falula Farms, Inc. (Falula Farms) 
brought this quiet title action to resolve own-
ership in a strip of land that was previously a 
county highway on the shores of Bear Lake. 
The trial court quieted title in Falula Farms 
and defendant Bonnie Ludlow (Mrs. Ludlow) 
appeals. We reverse and remand for the 
entry of judgment quieting title to the vacat-
ed strip of land in Mrs. Ludlow. 
FACTS 
In 1958, Alden and Delia Siddoway began 
developing a portion of their lakefront prop-
erty on Bear Lake. They designated ap-
proximately 160 acres for development and 
hired an engineer to survey, subdivide, and 
map-out the acreage. Thereafter, they sub-
mitted a plat of the subdivision, designated 
1. The plat map filed with the County Commis-
sion includes an owner's Declaration and Dedi-
cation signed by Alden Siddoway and the follow-
ing dedication of land for public rights-of-way: 
I hereby dedicate and set apart said BLOCK 
FOUR (4) Siddoway Sub-Division with the fol-
lowing stipulations and conditions here added: 
1. That I relinquish all rights to the new 
location of Public Right of Ways (Main Pub-
as Block 4, to the Rich County Commission 
for approval. As part of the development, 
the Siddoways dedicated various strips of 
land for public and private rights-of-way.1 
After obtaining the County Commission's 
approval, the Siddoways began selling lake-
front lots to the public. On August 11, 1958, 
the Siddoways sold Lots 80 and 81 of the 
Block Four Siddoway Subdivision to Hydro-
swift Corporation. In 1973, Hydroswift 
transferred ownership of the two lots to Mrs. 
Ludlow. Mrs. Ludlow, Hydroswift's succes-
sor in interest, was the secretary of Hydro-
swift, a corporation wholly owned by Mrs. 
Ludlow and her husband, Roy Ludlow. Al-
though Hydroswift purchased the two lots in 
August 1958, it did not record the warranty 
deeds to those lots until August 27, 1963. 
When purchased in 1958, the east boundary 
of both lots abutted a sixty-six foot public 
right-of-way for a county road, as indicated 
on the plat map filed with the County. 
Eleven years later, in 1969, Falula Farms, 
the Siddoways* successor in interest,2 peti-
tioned the Rich County Commission to move 
the existing sixty-six-foot-wide county road 
approximately twenty-two feet to the west 
Falula's purpose in moving the road was to 
free up more lakefront property for develop-
ment. To facilitate this move, Falula Farms 
executed, on October 30, 1969, a special war-
ranty deed in favor of Rich County, deeding 
a sixty-six foot strip of land for the new 
county road. In exchange, and on the same 
day, Rich County executed a quitclaim deed 
to Falula Farms for the twenty-two foot va-
cated strip of the old county road. 
The county road was subsequently moved 
twenty-two feet to the west. For the next 
eighteen years neither party to this suit 
raised the issue of ownership of the vacated 
strip of land. However, on August 6, 1987, 
Mrs. Ludlow filed a Notice of Claim assert-
Right of Ways) located and described herein, 
and hereby grant and convey them for perpet-
ual public use. 
(Emphasis added.) 
2. On January 26, 1962, Alden and Delia Siddo-
way transferred, by quitclaim deed, their remain-
ing lakefront property to Falula Farms, their 
wholly owned corporation. 
Utah 571 
Oates v. Cha-
vez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
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jng ownership of the vacated twenty-two foot review them for correctness 
strip of land abutting lots 80 and 81. In 
opposition to Mrs. Ludlow's claim, Falula 
Farms asserted its ownership of the same 
strip of land, by virtue of the 1969 quitclaim [3] 
deed executed by Rich County to Falula 
Farms. Falula Farms thereafter brought 
suit to quiet title. 
The trial court concluded that Falula 
Farms owned the disputed strip of land, sub-
ject to Mrs. Ludlow's easement for ingress 
and egress, because Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-
7 (1953),3 relied upon by Mrs. Ludlow, was 
repealed before Hydroswift recorded its 
deeds in 1963. Furthermore, the trial court 
held that the recording of the Siddoway Sub-
division Plat clearly evidenced the Siddo-
way's intention to grant ownership only to 
the specific tracts of land and not to any part 
of the road. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The parties raise four issues on appeal. 
However, because it is dispositive, we ad-
dress only the issue of whether the Siddo-
way's initial dedication of the county road in 
1958 granted an easement or fee title to Rich 
County, and if title, whether it was an abso-
lute or a defeasible fee. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] A quiet title action necessarily in-
volves an ultimate conclusion of law as to 
who owns the disputed piece of property. In 
reviewing the trial courts conclusions of law, 
we accord them no particular deference but 
3. Section 27-1-7 stated, in relevant part, that a 
"transfer of land bounded by a highway passes 
the title of the person whose estate is transferred 
to the middle of the highway." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-1-7 (1953) (repealed 1963). 
4
- The trial court concluded that § 27-1-7 was 
not applicable because the legislature repealed it 
before Hydroswift recorded its deeds in 1963, 
even though the lots had been purchased in 
1958. This conclusion is wrong for two reasons. 
First, the fact that Hydroswift recorded the deeds 
almost five years after it purchased the lots does 
not control whether the statute applies. The act 
of recording merely protects the property owner 
against subsequent good faith purchasers of the 
same property who purchased without notice. 
Failure to record, however, does not affect the 
ANALYSIS 
Common law principles regarding 
highways, roads, and public rights-of-way 
prescribe that the public obtains only an 
easement in a highway or road dedicated for 
public use. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 656 
P.2d 465, 471 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J., concur-
ring); Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 761 P.2d 
96, 98 (Wyo.1988). Furthermore, at common 
law the owner of land which abutted a high-
way owned up to the middle of the highway. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-7 (1953) (re-
pealed 1963) (replaced by id § 27-12-101 
(Supp.1993) (effective 1963)); Hummel v. 
Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P.2d 410, 411 
(1953). Thus, common law principles gave 
the public, represented by local government, 
no more than an easement in land dedicated 
as a public highway or road. Consequently, 
when a city or county abandoned or vacated 
a dedicated highway or road, the abutting 
landowners owned and possessed the under-
lying property to the middle of the highway 
or road. Mason, 656 P.2d at 471. 
In Utah, as well as many other states, 
however, the common law principles have 
been modified or completely changed by stat-
utory and case law. White v. Salt Lake City, 
121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952) ("We 
have clearly changed by statute the old com-
mon-law rule insofar as streets in platted 
subdivisions are concerned."). 
Thus, in 1958, when the Siddoways began 
developing their property, two seemingly 
conflicting statutes4 were on the books, one 
validity of a legitimate conveyance of real prop-
erty. See Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 
(Utah 1983); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist 
Church, 642 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). Thus, 
the date the lots were purchased, not the date the 
deeds were recorded, is controlling. Therefore, 
§ 27-1-7 applies in this case because Hydroswift 
purchased the lots five years before § 27-1-7 
was repealed. 
Second, although § 27-1-7 was repealed, a 
similar provision that retained the common law 
principle regarding ownership-to-the-middle-of-
the-highway was enacted at the same-time. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (Supp.1993) (en-
acted 1963). Thus, even if the date of recording 
were controlling, the common law principle of 
an abutting landowner owning to the center of 
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representing a codification of the common 
law and one representing a statutory modifi-
cation of the common law. First, section 27-
1-75 stated: 
By taking or accepting land for a high-
way the public acquires only the right of 
way and incidents necessary to enjoying 
and maintaining it. A transfer of land 
bounded by a highway passes the title of 
the person whose estate is transferred to 
the middle of the highway. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-7 (1953) (emphasis 
added) (repealed 1963). As noted by several 
early Utah cases, section 27-1-7 codified the 
common law rule. Brown v. Oregon Short 
Line R. Co., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740, 742 
(1909); Hummel, 265 P.2d at 411. 
Second, Chapter 5 of Title 57 of the Utah 
Code, dealing with Plats and Subdivisions, 
stated: 
Such maps and plats, when made, ac-
knowledged, filed and recorded, shall oper-
ate as a dedication of all such streets, 
alleys and other public places, and shall 
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are 
therein expressed, named or intended for 
public uses in such county, city or town 
for the public for the uses therein named 
or intended. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-4 (1990) (emphasis 
added) (repealed 1991) (replaced by id. § 10-
9-807 (1992) (effective July 1, 1992)). 
To resolve the apparent conflict between 
these two statutory provisions, we turn to a 
1982 decision by the Utah Supreme Court: 
We held in Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. v. 
Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P.2d 798 
(1954) there was no conflict between [sec-
tions 27-1-7 and 57-5-4] since the one 
statute deals with a dedication made by an 
owner who has prepared and recorded a 
the highway was codified and in force at all 
times during this case, either as § 27-1-7 or 
§ 27-12-101. 
5. This code provision was earlier found at Utah 
Code Ann. § 36-1-7 until its successor, § 27-1-
7, was enacted. Additionally, § 27-1-7 was re-
placed by Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (Supp. 
1993) (enacted 1963), which continued codifica-
tion of the same common law: 
(1) Title to real property acquired by the 
department or the counties, cities, and towns 
map or plat, and the other statute codifies 
the common law as regards other streets. 
In the case of recording a formal map &? 
plat our statutes give the public a fee 
interest, but in the case of a common law 
dedication the public acquires merely a 
right-of-way. 
Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 471 (Utah 
1982) (Howe, J., concurring) (emphasis add-
ed). Notably, the Mason court, in a depar-
ture from the common law, interpreted sec-
tion 27-1-7 as not prohibiting the state from 
acquiring a fee simple title to a strip of land 
used for a highway. Id. at 467. 
Thus, Mason instructs us in this case that 
section 57-5-4 controls because the Siddo-
ways "made, acknowledged, filed and record-
ed" a map of their subdivision with the Rich 
County Commission. Therefore, pursuant to 
that section, Rich County obtained a fee in-
terest in the strip of land dedicated for the 
county road. 
[4] The question remaining is what hap-
pened to the County's fee title when it vacat-
ed part of the old county road. The Utah 
Supreme Court has provided guidance in an-
swering that question by stating that even 
though the "[legislature did not regard the 
dedication to the public of a street in a 
platted subdivision as the surrender of an 
easement with retention of the fee to the 
corpus in the abutting owner," White v. Salt 
Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210, 213 
(1952), "[i]f the street should cease to serve 
any public interest, it may be abandoned and, 
in that case, the right to the use and control 
of the roadway would revert to the abutting 
owner pursuant to [section 27-1-7] and com-
mon law principles." Id. This language in 
White is consistent with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-12-102.5 (Supp.1993) which states: 
by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, con-
demnation, or otherwise for highway rights-of-
way or other highway purposes may be in fee 
simple or any lesser estate or interest. 
(2) A transfer of land bounded by a highway 
on a right-of-way for which 'the public has only 
an easement passes the title of the person whose 
estate is transferred to the middle of the high-
way. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Cite as 866 P2d 573 
The action of the county legislative body 
vacating or narrowing a county road which 
has been dedicated to public use by the 
proprietor, shall operate to the extent to 
which it is vacated or narrowed . . . as a 
revocation of the acceptance thereof and 
the relinquishment of the county's fees 
therein by the county legislative body. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, White and section 27-12-102.5 com-
pel the conclusion that Rich County original-
ly acquired a defeasible fee simple title,6 
rather than an absolute fee, from the Siddo-
ways in 1958.7 Thereafter, pursuant to 
White and section 27-12-102.5, the County 
lost that fee in 1969 when it vacated part of 
the roadway by moving it twenty-two feet to 
the west. Consequently, the fee simple title 
to the vacated strip of land reverted to Mrs. 
Ludlow. Mason, 656 P.2d at 471 (upon 
abandonment one-half of highway belongs to 
grantee or then present owner and not to 
original dedicator); Siegenthaler v. North 
Tillamook County Sanitary Auth., 26 Or. 
App. 611, 553 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1976) (same). 
From that point on, Mrs. Ludlow held the fee 
simple absolute title and enjoyed the exclu-
sive right to use and control the twenty-two 
foot strip of land. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by concluding as a 
matter of law that Falula Farms owned the 
disputed strip of land. The County obtained 
only a defeasible fee in the land used for a 
county road. Once the County vacated part 
or all of the roadway, it lost its fee and the 
6. Black's Law Dictionary defines a defeasible fee 
as "[a]n estate in fee that is liable to be defeated 
by some future contingency." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 418 (6th ed. 1990). In addition to the 
statutory and case law that compel us to find a 
defeasible fee, the language in the recorded plat 
regarding dedication of the road to the public for 
perpetual use" as a county road is consistent 
with our holding. That language arguably creat-
ed a condition subsequent, the occurrence of 
which would divest the County of its fee title, by 
stating: "I [Alden Siddoway] hereby . . . relin-
quish all rights to the new location of Public 
Right of Ways and hereby grant and convey them 
for perpetual public use." Thus, the County's fee 
title to the county road was valid so long as the 
strip of land was used by the public as a county 
road. The action by the County to vacate part of 
that road violated the condition subsequent and 
(Utah App. 1993) 
abutting property owner, Mrs. Ludlow,^  suc-
ceeded to the fee simple title of that land. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry 
of judgment quieting title in the disputed 
strip of land in Mrs. Ludlow. 
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
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7. We note that other western states have also 
adopted this position. See, e.g., Sutphin v. 
Mourning, 642 P.2d 34, 36 (Colo.App.1981) (stat-
utory provision gave abutting landowners fee ti-
tle when any roadway designated on plat was 
vacated); Bailey v. Ravalli County, 201 Mont. 
138, 653 P.2d 139, 143 (1982) (abandonment of 
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CASE NO. 910400527 
DATE: Februar 
.JUDGE: I YN^ 
This matter came before the Court for trial on Februar} 6, 1995. Plaintiffs appeared 
and were represented by James G. Clark. Defendant Provo City was represented by David C. 
Dixon. The Court heard testimony and received various documentor e 
matter under advisement. I "he Coui t, aftei carefully considering the e\ idence and arguments 
DECISION 
\ND PR* 
This matter was tried previously and appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals issued an 
opinion cited as Nelson v. Provo City, h The facts are 
essentially undisputed, and this Court lists the facts substantially the sam f 
Appeals. 
1 
Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal government deeded the 900 
South street, "Roadway", along with the abutting lands in trust to the local municipal 
authority, Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee. The Roadway existed as a public 
thoroughfare prior to this conveyance. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs1 predecessors 
in interest did not occupy the Roadway or the abutting property at the time of the Townsite 
conveyance. Nor do they dispute that the metes and bounds of each subsequent conveyance 
ran to the Roadway but did not specifically include it. 
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876 
deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to 
Plaintiffs Stephen Whitlock and Sheila Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone received 
another portion of the Stubbs parcel. Finally, in 1991, Plaintiffs Boyd Nelson and Lorraine 
Nelson received a deed for another portion of the Stubbs parcel. 
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the Roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of 
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First ward Pasture Company deeded its parcel to 
the City. 900 South continued to be used as a public roadway. In August of 1989, the City 
attempted to vacate the Roadway, but did not follow proper procedures. Shortly after the 
purported vacation, the City rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the property it owned to the 
south of the original route and sold the vacated portion of the original route to a commercial 
developer. Landowners sued the City claiming a reversionary interest in 1he Roadway from 
their property lines to the middle of the Roadway. On July 6, 1992, the trial court entered its 
verdict which was appealed. The appellate Court remanded the matter "for consideration of 
City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the 
2 
of legal title to the Roadway and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held equitable 
title to the Roadway pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent. 
The City subsequently conveyed portions of the property surrounding the Roadway to 
different individuals or entities. Plaintiffs have asserted that a conveyance of land abutting a 
description which does not include any portion of the Roadway).1 The Court believes that 
Plaintiffs1 argument would have merit if the City and the collective occupants of the city of 
The Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, James Dunn, obtained a deed to his property in 
3 1 rhe metes and bounds description of his deed excluded the street, In the Coin t s 
determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on which the Roadwa> A as located 
(albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the 
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an easement was created when the City received the land in trust which already contained the 
Roadway, the holder of the easement would be Provo City and the collective occupants of the 
circumstances the easement would merge with the fee. The Court cannot conceive of (and 
Plaintiffs have not presented preponderating evidence < he conveyance of property 
1
 Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-101 (1953 as amended) states: A transfer of 
land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the public has only an easement 
passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the highway. 
4 
abutting the Roadway deprives the owners of the underlying fee to the Roadway of their title.2 
The Court must now address the manner in which the City exercised its fiduciary 
duties as trustee holding title of the underlying fee of the Roadway. The appellate court 
determined that the City did not properly vacate the Roadway. However, in fact, it was not 
necessary for the City to formally vacate the Roadway because it held the title to the 
Roadway in trust. Vacatur procedures only seem necessary when the city simply has an 
easement for a road which it no longer intends to use. Thus, even though the city did not 
properly vacate the roadway, Plaintiffs could not have suffered damages specifically because 
of the improper vacation. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs may be entitled to recovery 
for damages caused because of the City's realignment of the street, and these issues will be 
addressed in part B of this discussion. 
This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and responsibility 
when it determined that it was in the best interest3 of the collective occupants of the city of 
Provo to realign the Roadway to create a functional intersection, and when it sold the 
2
 Hypothetically, suppose the Court accepts Plaintiffs1 theory that the landowner 
of property abutting a road impliedly holds title to the middle of the road, and the Court 
awarded Plaintiff the property up to the edge of the new road. Also, suppose the City 
realigned the road so that the new road started in the middle of the old road. According to 
Plaintiffs' theory, he would then be entitled to receive the property up to the middle of the last 
road. Now, suppose the City realigned the road again moving it further south. In theory, 
under these circumstances, Plaintiffs would be able to increase their acreage again by 
claiming property to the middle of the last road without ever purchasing the property. This 
theory creates a windfall for an abutting property owner who has never owned (nor has his 
predecessors in interest ever owned) title to the underlying fee on which the road is located. 
3
 The City certainly had authority to exercise its police power to realign the 
Roadway for the health, benefit and safety of the public. The issue here is who is entitled to 
the property where the old road was located. 
5 
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enjoying the benefits of a comer lot together with the other benefits of visibility, etc. which 
are associated with a property located on a main thoroughfare (particularly on a comer). The 
Court, believes Plaintiffs' injury is of the peculiar type which entitles them to compensation 
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1974). 
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of the injury was approximately September 18, 1991, when the City notified Plaintiffs of its 
intent to begin construction on the disputed property and demanded Plaintiffs to remove all 
property vehicles, i i||iii|iiiiir!il mil iilllliii IIII illi iiiil IIII llir nlil 'Nlini Smith iimnnli itrl', MHIIII I 
their property lines. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. The Court believes that 
the actual cause of Plaintiffs injury occurred in August/September of 1989 when 900 South 
was realigned taking away Plaintiffs' comer lots. Although the damage perhaps was no! lull I y 
realized until construction on the adjoining lot began, it is patently clear that it is the 
K J . . . 
status. Immediately after the realignment, if a willing purchaser desired to purchase any 
parcel of Plaintiffs1 property, the price the willing purchaser would pay for an interior parcel 
(which is the present status of Plaintiffs1 
the willing purchaser would be willing to pay for a comer lot (which was the former status of 
I property purpose: etermining Plaintiffs1 damages, the value of 
the damage should be determined as of the fall of 1989. 
At trial, each party presented evidence through very qualified appraisers. Plaintiffs1 
appuisu IIMIUI ui in mil lestifinl In Iln i ihn1 ml I1"! iiiillilll lnvi r nl DUnhi'i nil IIII'Ml 
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Defendant's appraiser testified as to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of July 1, 1989. In as 
much as there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs which valued their loss at the relevant 
time period, the Court is left with no choice but to accept the values testified to by 
Defendant's appraiser. Consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free & Associates, the 
Court finds that Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of 
$17,134 and Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal 
rate as of August/September of 1989. 
The Court has considered the other claims made by Plaintiffs and finds them to be 
unsupported by the evidence and without merit. Each party shall be responsible for their own 
attorney fees. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions 
of law consistent with this decision. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 17th day of February, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: James G. Clark, Esq. 
David C. Dixon, Esq. 
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enjoying the benefits of a comer lot together with the other benefits of visibility, etc which 
are associated with a property located on a main thoroughfare (particularly on a comer). The 
Court believes Plaintiffs' injury is of the peculiar type which entitles them to compensation. 
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1974). 
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of the injury was approximately September 18, 1991, when the City notified Plaintiffs of its 
intent to begin construction on the disputed property and demanded Plaintiffs to remove all 
I 
their property lines. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. The Court believes that 
the actual cause of Plaintiffs injury occurred in August/September of 1989 when 900 South 
was realigned taking away Plaintiffs' comer lots. Although the • da mage nerh.i.' ully 
realized until construction on the adjoining lot began, it is patently clear s it 
realignment of t h e i <:  >ad ;| a:; * 1 lich cai lsed th = compensable injury 
status. Immediately after the realignment, if a willing purchaser desired to purchase any 
parcel of Plaintiffs' property, the price the willing purchaser would pay for an interior parcel 
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the willing purchaser would be willing to pay for a comer lot (which was the former status of 
Plaintiffs' property 11lerefore, for purposes of determining Plaintiffs' damages, the value of 
the damage should be determined as of the fall of 1989. 
At trial, each party presented evidence through very qualified appraisers. Plaintiffs' 
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Defendant's appraiser testified as to the value of Plaintiffs1 loss as of July 1, 1989. In as 
much as there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs which valued their loss at the relevant 
time period, the Court is left with no choice but to accept the values testified to by 
Defendant's appraiser. Consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free & Associates, the 
Court finds that Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of 
$17,134 and Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal 
rate as of August/September of 1989. 
The Court has considered the other claims made by Plaintiffs and finds them to be 
unsupported by the evidence and without merit. Each party shall be responsible for their own 
attorney fees. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions 
of law consistent with this decision. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 17th day of February, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: James G. Clark, Esq. 
David C. Dixon, Esq. 
8 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN, #6617 
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
BOYD NELSON, LORRAINE NELSON, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




P i, : ( 
Defendant. : Judge Lyra W. Davis f\c\rd < *c\ ,'Jf 
i ins matter came betore uic ^oun iw! L„u,miicDiuai\ v.. . ": rLir.i.i; 
appeared and were represented by their counsel, James G. Clark. Defendant was r-TT^ented 
by counsel David C. Dixon. The Court having heard testimony, received various 
documentary evidence, and taken the matter under advisement now. therefore, finds as 
follows: 
SlAihOi- I LAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds the facts of the matter are essentially undisputed, and are 
substantially the same as those found by the Court of Appeals as cited in its opinion, Nelson v. 
Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994). 
A. The court finds that pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal 
government deeded the 900 South Street, "Roadway", along with the abutting lands in trust 
to the local municipal authority, Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee. The Roadway 
existed as a public thoroughfare prior to this conveyance. The Court finds that the parties do 
not dispute that Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest did not occupy the Roadway at the time 
of the Townsite conveyance. The Court further finds that the parties also do not dispute that 
the metes and bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to the Roadway but did not 
specifically include it. 
B. The Court finds that in 1871 Smoot deeded land north of the Roadway to James 
Dunn, who in 1876 deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. The Court also finds that in 1982, a 
portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to Plaintiffs Stephen Whitlock and Sheila Whitlock. 
The court further finds that in 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone received another portion of the 
Stubbs parcel, and that in 1991 Plaintiffs Boyd Nelson and Lorraine Nelson received a deed 
for another portion of the Stubbs parcel. 
C. The Court finds that in 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the Roadway to John 
P.R. Johnson, as trustee of the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First Ward Pasture 
2 
Company deeded its parcel to the City 900 South continued to be used as a public roadvv a> 
In August of 1989, the City attempted to vacate the Roadway, but did not follow proper 
f "iv rerouted a portion of 900 South 
o n t 0 the "• -'v1* ii owned to the south of the original route and sold the improperly vacated 
portion oi me original route to a commercial developer. Plaintiffs sued the City claiming a 
reiei'sioiiai \ niieiesi, in nine h ojii\ ,,n li in men' property lines to the middle of the Roadway. 
2. This Court finds that the Court of Appeals held that "the Townsite Act conveyed the 
Roadwa* u Cih ' :: ;M ^rh " Nelson, 872 P.2d at 3S T-h> case was remanded to consider the 
( .: , i . . - . M I L . , have not presented evidence 
that anyone other than the City or the collective occupants of the Cit> were equitable owi lei s • :)f tl le 
property prior to the 1869 patent. 
3 subsequently conveyed portions oi the property surrounding 
the Roadway to different individuals or entities. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs 1 ia\ e asserted 
that a conveyance of land abutting a road impliedly conveys the land to the middle of the road (in 
spite of a metes and hot inds description which does not include any porti»-:. ! :; *. . w^iwayV 
4. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, James Dunn, obtained a deed to 
his property in 1871. The Court also finds that the metes and bounds description of his deed 
exclude--, line Mn.vi 1 in- < 'mill finds thai I he l"'il\ In/Id iijje In (he land urn vwinii the Ruadna) was 
located (albeit in trust). 
5. The Court finds that the City did not properly vacate the Roadway. However, in fact, it 
3 
Roadway in trust. Vacatur procedures only seem necessary when the city simply has an easement 
for a road which it no longer intends to use. 
-6. The Court finds that at Trial Plaintiffs cited Utah cases to the court asserting that they 
support the Plaintiffs' claim for compensation for the loss of their corner lots. Defendant cited cases 
asserting that the facts of this case do not entitle Plaintiffs to compensation. After carefully 
reviewing all of the cases cited by counsel, the Court finds the discussion in Three D Corp. v. Salt 
Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah App. 1988) which was cited and followed in Carpet Barn v. State 
bv and through DOT, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App. 1990) to be most helpful. In Three D Corp. after 
discussing the various precedents, the Court stated: 
While it must be conceded that these precedents are not entirely 
consistent, we believe they can be largely harmonized if viewed as 
establishing three general principles: 1) Where governmental action, 
not amounting to a physical taking, effectively deprives a property 
owner of reasonable access [sic] to property, the owner is entitled to 
compensation, [sic]; 2) Where governmental action, not amounting to 
a physical taking, merely interferes with an owner's access to 
property, the owner is not entitled to compensation so long as the 
owner still has reasonable access, [sic]; 3) Where governmental 
action, not amounting to a physical taking, substantially impairs a 
right appurtenant to an owner's property, or otherwise causes peculiar 
injury and thereby results in substantial devaluation, the owner is 
entitled to compensation [sic]. 
Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1325-26. 
The Court finds that although no physical taking occurred, Plaintiffs lost the status of 
enjoying the benefits of a corner lot together with the other benefits of visibility, etc, which are 
associated with a property located on a main thoroughfare (particularly on a corner). 
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7. The Court finds that the actual cause of Plaintiffs' injury occurred in August/September 
of 1989 when 900 South was realigned, taking away Plaintiffs' corner lots. Although the damage 
perhaps was not fully realized until construction on the adjoining lot began, it is patently clear that it 
is the realignment of the roadway which caused the compensable injury -- the loss of the corner lot 
status. 
8. The Court finds that two appraisals were presented as evidence. Plaintiffs' appraisal 
testified only to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of October of 1991. Defendant's appraiser testified 
to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of July 1, 1989. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon testimony of the parties and documentary evidence, and having taken the matter 
under advisement, the Court now, therefore, concludes as follows: 
1. The Court concludes that no one other than the City or the collective occupants of the 
City were equitable owners of the property prior to the 1869 patent and, therefore, the City became 
the holder in trust of legal title to the Roadway and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held 
equitable title to the Roadway pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent. 
2. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' assertion that a conveyance of land abutting a road 
impliedly conveys the land to the middle of the road would have merit if the City and the collective 
occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use the road. 
3. The Court concludes that the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the grant of an 
easement which would carry with it a revisionary interest. Even supposing that an easement was 
created when the City received the land in trust which already contained the Roadway, the holder of 
5 
the easement would be Provo City and the collective occupants of the City of Provo — the same 
parties who held title to the underlying fee — under these circumstances the esisement would merge 
with the fee. 
4. The Court concludes that the City did not properly vacate the roadway; however. 
Plaintiffs could not have suffered damages specifically because of the improper vacation. 
5. The Court concludes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and responsibility 
when it determined that it was in the best interest of the collective occupants of the city of Provo to 
realign the Roadway to create a functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property 
which it held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general treasury for the 
benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo. 
6. The Court concludes that the actual cause of Plaintiffs' injury occurred in 
August/September of 1989 when 900 South was realigned taking away Plaintiffs' corner lots. 
Therefore, for the purposes of determining Plaintiffs' damages, the value of the damage should be 
determined as of the fall of 1989. 
7. The Court concludes that consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free and 
Associates, the Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of $17,134 and 
Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal rate as of August/September of 
1989. 
8. The Court concludes that the other claims made by Plaintiffs are unsupported by 
evidence and without merit. 
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9. The Court concludes that each party should be responsible to pay their own attorney fees. 
10. Costs to be determined hereafter awarded pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED AND SIGNED this jj_ day of /fctf , 199^_. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
JUDJ3E LYNN W. DAVIS 
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